The First Step on the Way Forward
Saturday, November 22, 2008 at 05:31AM Cheryl Rofer has issued a challenge to identify the way forward on nuclear weapons. In a series of posts she reviews the Bush Administration record (here and here), critiques the efforts of Cirincione and Perkovich (here), and offers her own prescription (here.)
I'd like to take up that challenge. I think Cirincione is right to quote Panofsky (“Given that the risks posed by nuclear weapons far outweigh their benefits in today’s world, the United States should lead a worldwide campaign to de-emphasize their role in international relations.”). I think this is the critical first step, the action from which all subsequent progress would flow, for the following reasons.
Any approach to thinking about nuclear weapons must be practical. If nuclear weapons are genuinely useful, if they really do add to your security, then you've got to keep them. Saying they're immoral or illegal or you don't like them will never be enough if they are perceived to be genuinely useful. Necessity almost always trumps morality. So the first step in abolishing nuclear weapons is dispelling the perception that they are powerful, impressive, useful. Devaluing nuclear weapons will make all subsequent diplomatic and political efforts immeasurably easier.
There are four broad claims for nuclear weapons: 1) they win wars, 2) they are the ultimate defense, 3) they coerce others, 4) they give prestige.
They win wars. The first and most important step in debunking this myth is to show that bombing Hiroshima didn't coerce the Japanese to surrender. This is relatively easy, as most of the evidence points to this conclusion. I've written something on this (here), but much more public education is necessary. There need to be major articles in popular journals (Atlantic, New Yorker), there needs to be major media coverage (especially television), and there needs to be much more in new media (YouTube, blogosphere.)
Second, the US government should declassify some of the studies done which convinced the military that using nuclear weapons on the battlefield was impractical. We know that they eventually arrived at this conclusion because when President George H. W. Bush retired most of the tactical nuclear weapons in the early 1990s, the professional military did not protest at all. Officials studies of the difficulties of really using nuclear weapons - of their impracticality on the battlefield - would go a long way toward convincing non-nuclear nations that they made the right choice in deciding not to build nuclear weapons and in persuading incipient nuclear nations that the weapons aren't worth the cost and effort.
Finally, both the US and Soviet Union lost wars even though they possessed "the ultimate weapon" while their opponent did not. Despite their awesome reputation, the practical record of nuclear weapons is surprisingly unimpressive. Not enough has been made of the failures of nuclear weapons. Rather than make excuses for these failures, they should be emphasized and examined critically.
They are the ultimate defense. Again, I've written something undermining the notion of deterrence (here). Deterrence has worked its way into the popular imagination (and much official imagination) as something solid and real. It is, however, only a theory. It needs to be widely and effectively attacked and undermined. People often say, for example, that nuclear weapons prevent others from attacking or invading you. This assertion simply cannot be supported based on the evidence. It is pure wishful thinking. Both Great Britain (Falklands War) and Israel (Yom Kippur War) were attacked despite possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons did not deter al Qaeda from attacking the US and it is difficult to see how they could ever deter terrorists.
More needs to be written about deterrence. It is often treated as a solid, proven, tangible fact. It is no such thing. It is at best an oddly conceived theory with little real-world evidence supporting it. There is a great deal that could be said that would undermine the notion that deterrence provides the ultimate defense.
They coerce others. Again, the evidence is quite thin. Nuclear weapons are frightening, no question. But can that fear really be used reliably to get what you want?
They give prestige. Once the three assertions above have been called into question and the process of negotiating their abandonment is underway, this argument will fade on its own.
One of the advantages of a campaign to devalue nuclear weapons is that the United States nonproliferation community could lead the way without waiting for government approval or participation. How we think about nuclear weapons is important - especially because they've been used so rarely and therefore our practical experience is so limited. The first generation's view of nuclear weapons were shaped by ridiculous overstatements ("they've made war impossible," "they've changed everything," they are "the winning weapon.") Even sixty years on, we are still in the grip of exaggeration and hyperbole, we still believe inflated claims for which there is hardly any evidence. Reshaping our view is a valuable, no, an essential first step in abolishing these weapons.
As long as the weapons are viewed as awesome, powerful and effective, we will never be able to abolish them. When they are viewed as big, blundering and not very useful, though, we will already be halfway there.
Reader Comments (1)
The idea of minimum deterrence really strikes a chord with a lot of people. It remains useful as an illusion of security (if that sort of thing works for you).